Every wildland fire control organization in North America relies on assistance from outside agencies during periods of extreme fire severity.In some cases interagency cooperation is formalized, as in the Northeast Forest Fire Compact or the Boise Interagency Fire Center. In other cases informal arrangements are made as needed, with organizations such as the Canadian Committee on Forest Fire Control serving to enhance communication and the exchange of information. A basic assumption inherent in any system in which outside support is relied on during periods of extreme activity is that the intended lending agency is in a position to provide assistance. Agencies are willing to share resources when fire activity levels are below average, but they are unwilling to share when activity levels are above average. In fact, if a potential lender faces extreme difficulties, it will compete for resources rather than provide assistance. Therefore, it is important to interagency cooperation in fire control to know the probability of occurrence of three states of nature: (1) below average fire activity (ability to help), (2) average activity (neutrality), and (3) very high to extreme activity (competition). The purpose of this paper is to address the question of simultaneous interagency demand for supplemental resources.